Blippy, Facebook, and Lifelock, oh my! Each of these companies have come under scrutiny lately for mishandling, misusing, divulging, or otherwise playing a smoke and mirrors game with confidential information. This vignette is dedicated to conveying a different perspective on each situation, one that will hopefully convince you:
- that security controls will only be as tight as consumers demand, and
- that things can be different (better) with your help.
We just want to get this “disclaimer” out of the way, here and now in the first paragraph before you have a chance to form an opinion about our suggestions. We’re not condoning the actions or otherwise diminishing the liability of these companies (or any company for that matter) who has caused consumers or businesses time, harm, and any other loss because of a breach and subsequent leak of personally identifiable information (PII). The spirit of this article is to create awareness of the risks and to help everyone reading (consumers and business owners) understand that taking steps toward prevention is a collaborative effort in which consumers and companies alike must embark to see results. And so with that…
Blippy’s Security Blip
Synopsis: Credit card numbers for a limited number of beta users leaked into Google search results.
Blippy’s responsibility: Breaking this down to the most simple terms, Blippy’s dev team should have secluded all test data into a non-production environment. Furthermore, per PCI guidelines for SDLC dictate that all sample data must be purged from all accounts prior to launching the production environment. If you’ve visited the Blippy website or signed up for an account however, you’ll notice that there is no mention of PCI compliance or a PCI compliance badge… anywhere.
That’s because (arguably) Blippy isn’t governed by the payment card industry data security standard since they don’t directly collect or store credit card data. When the data leaked, all fingers pointed at Blippy (and rightfully so, I mean anyone who can read saw the cc numbers available in the statements associated with each user’s account.) The bigger problem however seems to be the fact that the issuing bank or credit card company allowed full, unencrypted, unmasked credit card numbers to be printed and/or stored on public statements.
Personal responsibility: Consider this. Participants in a clinical drug trial assume a large amount of risk by ingesting the pharmaceuticals under investigation. Wouldn’t a similar principle of risk apply when technology users participate in a beta, alpha, or electronic test of any kind?
Perhaps language in the warnings about unregulated pharmaceuticals is more ominous (or the risks more personal) prompting consumers take caution. Should commercial business ventures be more blatant about their warranties and have stronger indemnification policies so early adopters will think twice before signing on?
Consumers must realize that they are “swimming at their own risk” when participating in pre-releases of new, untested technologies. Blippy adopters who confidently linked bank accounts, retail payment card accounts, and credit card accounts to the service can’t be completely shocked when something goes awry with the system. Can they?
Bottom line: It is every business’ responsibility to take all measures possible to prevent problems like this from arising. It’s the consumer’s responsibility to perform due diligence and maintain our confidential information in higher regard and think twice before divulging information that could cause them harm.
